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ABSTRACT: 
The conservative German publicist and political theorist, Constantin Frantz (1817-1891), occupies an 
ambiguous place in German intellectual history.  Some, such as Friedrich Meinecke, located him 
within the rich intellectual tradition of German federalism, highlighting his hostility to the idea of the 
“nation-state” and the traditions of nationalism, Realpolitik and militarism.  Others, by contrast, have 
situated him within a long genealogy of German fascism, identifying his remarkable 1852 work, Louis 
Napoleon, as a kind of precursor or antecedent of twentieth-century fascist ideology.  This 
interpretation raises broader questions about the historiography on Bonapartism and Caesarism, which 
has often been motivated by an interest in the intellectual origins of modern fascism.  The present 
article supplies a reinterpretation of Frantz’s thinking about Bonapartism (Napoleonismus) and 
Caesarism by focusing on a much broader range of his intellectual output and by tracking the 
development of his view of Bonapartism’s significance between 1851 and the early 1870s.  The main 
outcome is not just to question Frantz’s place in the “prehistory” of fascism, but also to show how 
deeply nineteenth-century debates about Bonapartism were connected to concerns about liberalism, 
democracy, nationalism and imperialism.   
 
ARTICLE:  
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To what extent are modern liberal democracies vulnerable to subversion by authoritarian, 
illiberal demagogues?  This question – by no means irrelevant in our own time – was debated 
particularly intensively during the three decades after 1848, a period in which a toxic 
combination of demagoguery, nationalism and imperialism appeared to be driving many 
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European states towards a modern rerun of ancient Rome’s Caesarist disaster.  One of the 
most intriguing nineteenth-century answers to the question was outlined by the conservative 
German publicist and political thinker Constantin Frantz (1817-1891).  Resident in Paris 
during the Bonapartist coup d’état of December 2nd 1851, and later a vocal critic of the 
demagogic manoeuvres of Otto von Bismarck during the period of the foundation of the 
German Reich, Frantz was a careful analyst of the new imperial regime that emerged in 
France after 1851, reflected seriously on the ways in which liberal-democratic politics might 
spawn their own forms of plebiscitary Caesarism, and addressed the ramifications of 
Bonapartism for the future of the international state system.  For anybody seeking to 
understand the ways in which the subjects of Bonapartism and Caesarism were connected to 
discussions of liberalism, democracy, nationalism and imperialism in German political 
thought after 1848, Frantz’s works constitute an excellent starting point. 
 
Yet there is a further reason why Frantz’s works deserve re-examination, and that is his 
deeply ambiguous place in some of the central narratives that run through modern German 
intellectual history.  On the one hand, Frantz has often been read as a theorist of German and 
European federalism whose writings were characterised by an abiding hostility to the idea of 
the nation-state, by distrust of amoral Realpolitik, and by a Christian-inflected, cosmopolitan 
vision of a peaceful, European federation of peoples (Völkerbund).
1
  This view puts Frantz at 
odds with the dominant, Prussocentric “national tradition” in German historiography that 
found its nineteenth-century culmination in the works of Heinrich von Treitschke and aligns 
him, instead, with Germany’s remarkably rich intellectual traditions of federalism.2  Although 
this line of interpretation found adherents in the Weimar period, it made Frantz a particularly 
attractive figure for historians writing after 1945, who searched for intellectual alternatives to 
Germany’s recent experience of aggressive, exclusionary nationalism.3  Friedrich Meinecke, 
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writing about “the German catastrophe” in the immediate aftermath of the Second World War, 
placed Frantz alongside the Swiss historian Jacob Burckhardt as authors who believed that 
Bismarck’s policy was “destroying certain foundations of Western culture and the 
community of states” and who resisted the “victory of Machiavellism over the principles of 
morality and justice in international relations.”4  Franz Schnabel wrote admiringly in 1950 of 
Frantz’s federalist critique of the united German nation-state, and praised his prescience in 
foreseeing that Europe’s “great powers” would come to be superseded by competing world 
empires.
5
  The federalist interpretation has been restated most recently in an authoritative 
article by Winfried Becker.
6
  On the other hand, Frantz has been situated within the long 
intellectual genealogy of German fascism.  This view rests on the apparent affinities between 
his account of nineteenth-century Bonapartism and twentieth-century ideas of plebiscitary 
Caesarism and dictatorship.  Here Frantz appears not so much as a proto-federalist as a proto-
fascist. 
 
The story of how this latter view emerged is itself fascinating.  Frantz’s best-known work, his 
1852 Louis Napoleon, was reissued in 1933 by J. P. Mayer (under the pseudonym Franz 
Kemper) in an edition which pointed out the relevance of the text for understanding the Nazi 
seizure of power (Machtergreifung) in January 1933.
7
  As Mayer noted in his Foreword and 
Introduction, Frantz’s account was of “decisive significance” for the “social-historical 
situation of the present,” and thus shed light on the rise of a Führer who had superseded the 
Weimar “party state” and spoke to the masses in their own language.8  While Mayer’s own 
intention was to use Frantz’s text as an indication of the dangers of plebiscitary politics, his 
edition may have prompted the attention lavished on Frantz by writers like Ewald Schaper, 
who wrote in 1940 that Frantz “pointed the way towards a new, synthetic epoch 
[synthetisches Zeitalter]…which only became a reality in the twentieth century, in National 
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Socialism and fascism.”9  A similarly overblown teleological interpretation, connecting 
Frantz’s alleged “nationalism” to Hitler’s racist Weltanschauung, appeared in Peter Viereck’s 
1941 Metapolitics (whose title was inspired by a quotation from Frantz).
10
  More surprisingly 
perhaps, affinities between Frantz’s ideas and those of fascist ideologues have also been 
identified by the circle of historians involved in the Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe, which 
began to appear in the 1970s.  Reinhart Koselleck’s interest in Frantz is visible in his famous 
article on “Crisis” (Krise), but more significant is the suggestive link that Koselleck made, in 
his 1977 essay “Neuzeit,” between Frantz’s conception of Bonapartist dictatorship and Carl 
Schmitt’s notion of the “sovereign dictator.”11  This was little more than a hint, but Dieter 
Groh had already made a more explicit claim in the article on Caesarism (and related terms) 
that appeared in the first (1972) volume of the Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe.  According to 
Groh, Frantz’s rejection of parliamentarism, along with his “more-or-less explicit Führerkult,” 
constituted “one of the intellectual-historical roots of fascist ideologies and even of Lenin’s 
theory of revolution.”12  Subsequent historians considered whether Frantz should be 
described as a Bonapartist precursor of Schmitt, while yet others have underscored his 
antisemitism and his (alleged) “pan-Germanism” as yet further indications of his “Nazi-like 
doctrine.”13  And while more recent historians have not necessarily endorsed the image of 
Frantz as a forerunner of National Socialist ideals, his reputation as a German Bonapartist 
appears to have stuck.  For instance, in his contribution to Peter Baehr’s and Melvin Richter’s 
edited volume Dictatorship in History and Theory (2004), David E. Barclay has written of 
Frantz’s “avowedly Bonapartist views” and of his “support for a ‘Caesarist’, plebiscitary 
state.”14 
 
This article offers an alternative reading of Frantz’s thinking about Bonapartism and 
Caesarism as this developed in the period between 1848 and 1871.  Its central argument is 
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that the description of Frantz as a German Bonapartist rests on a highly selective reading of 
his publications from 1851-52 and downplays his subsequent intellectual output in which he 
was wholly critical of modern Bonapartism (or Caesarism) and its implications for Europe.  
In order to see this, it is necessary to position Frantz’s evolving account of Napoleonismus – 
the term he consistently used for the phenomenon in France – against his assessment of the 
changing nature of international relations, his increasingly critical posture towards liberalism 
(in both Germany and Europe), and his awareness that a reckless adherence to the “principle 
of nationality” (Nationalitätsprinzip) had the capacity to launch Europe into destructive 
militarism and warfare among latter-day Caesarist rulers.  More broadly, the article 
challenges Groh’s claim that Frantz should be understood as an intellectual forerunner of 
twentieth-century fascist ideology.  The quest for antecedents in intellectual history is 
notoriously prone to slip into various anachronistic “mythologies,” as Quentin Skinner 
pointed out many years ago, and these may be especially acute when considering the 
intellectual origins of fascism.
15
  In Frantz’s case, there is a particular risk of transforming 
him into a kind of proto-Schmittian, as if his critical perspective upon nineteenth-century 
liberalism and parliamentarism inevitably entailed a positive endorsement of the kind of 
plebiscitary Caesarism that so captivated Schmitt in the 1920s.
16
  This, I think, would be to 
succumb to a form of the “package logic” that, in a different context, Anthony La Vopa has 
identified as a particular peril for historians of ideas.
17
  This is not to say that all difficulties 
of interpretation can be resolved by the application of a thoroughgoing historical 
contextualisation.  It is to suggest that we need understand nineteenth-century accounts of 
Bonapartism and Caesarism as far as possible on their own terms, without entirely closing off 
the valid historical question of the relationship between Bonapartism, Caesarism and fascism. 
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Frantz’s reputation as a German Bonapartist and a precursor of National Socialist ideology 
rests largely on the evidence of his 1852 work, Louis Napoleon.  This short book, which is 
sometimes compared with such famous contemporary works as Marx’s Eighteenth Brumaire 
of Louis Bonaparte (1852) or Pierre-Joseph Proudhon’s La Révolution sociale démontrée par 
le coup d’état du 2 decembre 1851, was certainly among the most distinctive German 
contributions to the European debate about the nature and prospects of the new Napoleonic 
regime established in 1851-52.
18
  The text is perhaps best compared with a near-
contemporary work like Bruno Bauer’s Rußland und das Germanenthum (1853), which also 
addressed the relationship between a mass-based “extreme democracy” and the revival of a 
Bonapartist Kaisertum in France, and which bore the marks of its author’s growing 
disillusionment with the work of Hegel.
19
  Nevertheless, the pamphlet was not the only work 
of Frantz’s from these years that addressed the subjects of Bonapartism and Caesarism.  He 
had first considered the prospect of a Bonapartist coup d’état soon after his arrival in France 
(in the autumn of 1851) in a memorandum to the Prussian interior minister, Otto Theodor von 
Manteuffel, under whose auspices Frantz had undertaken his journey to Paris.
20
  The link 
between Frantz and Manteuffel is significant, because it is sometimes taken as a marker of 
Frantz’s commitment to a modernizing, interventionist monarchy in Prussia, in contrast to the 
more traditional corporatist legitimism of the “High Conservative” Gerlach circle.21  He also 
addressed the problem of Bonapartism in a further publication from 1852, entitled Die 
Staatskrankheit, which contained an explicit discussion of Napoleonismus as the modern 
form of Cäsarismus.
22
  We need to consider all three of these works in order to obtain a clear 
perspective on Frantz’s thinking about Napoleonismus in the early 1850s. 
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The October 1851 memorandum to Manteuffel is important because it contains the seeds of 
some of the ideas that Frantz would later express in Louis Napoleon.  The purpose of the 
memorandum was to convey to Manteuffel detailed information about the key economic and 
political developments in France at the time.  He also discussed changes to the systems of 
suffrage and representation in France between 1849 and 1851, a topic that will have been 
relevant to Manteuffel, who had played a role in the reform of the Prussian electoral law 
earlier in 1851.  Yet the central theme of this memorandum was undoubtedly Frantz’s deep 
hostility to what he called the Repräsentativsystem (and sometimes Parlamentarismus) – one 
of the abiding preoccupations of Frantz’s political thought.23  Here we can certainly detect a 
partial endorsement of what we might call the Bonapartist combination of mass politics with 
an authoritarian state, and of its capacity to transcend liberal parliamentary vacillation.  
Frantz wrote admiringly of Louis-Napoleon’s exploitation of universal suffrage as a means of 
neutralising his parliamentary opponents, such as the interior minister (and liberal political 
economist), Léon Faucher.
24
  He argued for substituting a rational system of “administrative 
reform” in place of the chaotic “agitations of the Repräsentativsystem.”  He suggested that a 
Bonapartist regime was likely to be far more viable in France than a restored hereditary 
monarchy.  Finally, he prefigured one of the themes of the later Louis Napoleon by 
suggesting that the establishment of a Napoleonic order in France was likely to be compatible 
with the peace of Europe (die Ruhe Europas).
25
 
 
Many of these arguments were reworked and amplified in Louis Napoleon itself, which, if 
read teleologically, and in isolation from Frantz’s other works, does indeed seem to support 
some of the bolder claims made about Frantz’s place in prehistory of German fascism.  The 
key argument of Louis Napoleon concerned the necessity of Napoleonismus for the situation 
in which France now found itself.  France had undergone a destructive revolution at the end 
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of the eighteenth century which had destroyed the hierarchical society of the ancien régime, 
and the resulting society, in which the people were an atomized, undifferentiated mass, 
demanded the establishment of a Napoleonic-style regime.  In particular, Frantz argued that 
the emerging Napoleonic empire was far superior to both the bourgeois July Monarchy and 
the parliamentary Second Republic, both of which he associated with elitism and “organised 
demagogy.”  (It is worth noting that Frantz never associated Napoleonismus with demagogy, 
which for him was a phenomenon of elitist parliamentarism).
26
  While some countries, such 
as England and the United States, could handle the demands of representative government, 
atomised and centralized countries like France would only degenerate into demagogy if they 
sought to replicate this.  Running alongside this claim about the superiority of Napoleonismus 
to Parlamentarismus for the circumstances of post-revolutionary France, Frantz also 
criticised the liberal faith in “doctrines” or parliamentary discussion, and instead celebrated 
the rule of vital, decisive personalities.
27
 
 
Much of the body of Frantz’s text was devoted to exploring the nature of Napoleonismus as a 
distinctive type of modern republic.  It is crucial to emphasise this republican dimension, 
although Frantz distinguished Napoleonismus from both the republics of antiquity, as well as 
the modern, federal republics of Switzerland and the United States.
28
  Napoleonic 
republicanism was instead characterised by the dominance of the executive over the 
legislature, the primacy of “physical force” (i.e. the army), and – crucially – a radical revision 
of the classical republican notion of dictatorship.  This is indicated in the following passage, 
which is also cited by Koselleck: 
 
 One should not be afraid of this word dictatorship (Diktatur), it is in reality so.  The 
dictatorship constitutes the essential constitutional form (Verfassungsform) of the 
9 
 
French Republic, which is nevertheless a republic, since dictatorship is not a royal 
office, but rather belongs to republican development.  However, whereas the 
dictatorship was only exceptionally employed in other republics, here it is 
fundamental, because the French Republic constitutes a completely exceptional state-
form, the like of which has never been seen before.
29
 
 
At the same time, Napoleonismus was by no means undemocratic, since it was grounded on 
popular sovereignty and gave expression, at least in theory, to the “will of the people” 
(Volkswille).  Pointing to the widespread support for Napoleon’s coup d’état among the 
majority of France’s (male) inhabitants, Frantz argued that the democratic critics of the coup 
were being inconsistent and even hypocritical: while democrats claimed to endorse majority 
rule and popular sovereignty, they failed to accept its logic when the masses endorsed 
authoritarian leaders through plebiscites.
30
  He explicitly described the regime as a republic 
resting “essentially on democratic foundations,” where the state power was the representative 
of the “collective will” (Kollectivwille).  The vision here was of a kind of reciprocal moral 
union of people and its leader (Chef), in which the leader would devote himself to serving the 
people, while embodying its collective will.
31
  Seen from this perspective, Frantz implied that 
Napoleonismus might be seen as a more authentic version of democracy than the indirect 
forms of liberal parliamentarism (Parlamentarismus) that currently existed in Britain, and 
had previously existed under the July Monarchy.  Napoleonism, Frantz summarised, was a 
“republic with democratic social-forms and Napoleonic government-form.”32 
 
Another area in which Frantz expressed enthusiasm about Napoleonismus in 1852 was that of 
international politics.  In the chapter entitled “Der Napoleonismus und Europa” he was 
strikingly positive about the likely international repercussions of Louis-Napoleon’s rule, 
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claiming that a renewed Napoleonic regime within France would constitute a beneficial 
counterweight against the rising power of Britain and Russia.  Napoleonism would, 
furthermore, reinvigorate an increasingly stagnant continent, without embarking on the sorts 
of conquest that had characterised the first Napoleonic Empire.
33
  Frantz even went so far as 
to depict Louis-Napoleon as a “new Hercules,” clearing out the Augean stables of a stagnant 
continent and slaying the hydra of demagogy.
34
  And although he recognized the military 
basis of the new regime, he rejected any straightforward parallel between the emerging 
Second Empire and the praetorian empire of post-republican Rome.  In 1852, at least, 
Napoleonism was compatible with Europe’s peace and stability. 
 
Despite all this, some caveats about Frantz’s alleged “Bonapartism” are in order.  First of all, 
we should simply note that Frantz’s claim that Bonapartism had become “unavoidable” in 
France does not imply a warm endorsement of the regime on its own merits.  Second, and 
relatedly, it is crucial to recognize that Frantz was by no means calling for the establishment 
of a Napoleonic state in Prussia, or in any other German state.  While Bonapartism was well-
suited to France’s situation as a post-revolutionary “atomized” society, it was in no sense 
suitable for societies (including England and Germany) that still retained, at least partially, 
the “aristocratic-hierarchical” structures of the ancien régime.35  One of the leading themes of 
Frantz’s political thought was his deep scepticism towards the idea of imposing foreign 
constitutional models on countries for which they were unfitted, and he was particularly 
scathing of Tocqueville’s efforts to use the United States constitution as a model for a 
reformed French republic.
36
  This was in line with his later criticisms of the Frankfurt 
parliamentarians of 1848-49, who he believed were engaged in a similarly misguided project 
to transform German states into modern constitutional republics.
37
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Frantz fervently wanted Prussia to avoid the fate of the French ancien régime, and suggested 
that the best means towards this was for the Prussian monarchy to bring itself into a living 
relationship with “all the factors of national development.”38  Here Frantz probably had in 
mind a version of the “social monarchy” idea that inspired many German conservatives in 
this period, an idea that centred on promoting the Crown’s role as a protector of the “masses” 
and as a force for social cohesion.  This would have brought him fairly close to Manteuffel, 
and possibly to some of his more intellectually eclectic contemporaries, such as Lorenz Stein 
or Jozef Maria von Radowitz.
39
  Frantz had expressed enthusiasm for this sort of reformed 
monarchical order, transcending social divisions, in his writings from the 1840s, when he 
called for the royal “organisation of the masses” as a route to strengthening social stability 
and avoiding the perils of modern constitutionalism.
40
  More details as to the precise means 
by which this could be accomplished appeared in Frantz’s Die Staatskrankheit (published 
somewhat later in 1852), in which he claimed that the key task facing Europe’s remaining 
dynastic rulers was to strengthen the “social bond” (Band) between monarchy and people, 
and thereby to reconcile the various elements of a divided nation.
41
  Here he was emphatic 
that this was quite different from Caesarism or Napoleonism, which rested on popular 
sovereignty and issued in a naked form of intensified state power (Staatsgewalt).  Instead, he 
argued that vigorous royal leadership in resolving the modern “social question”, in organising 
modern industrial associations, and in breaking the contradictions between bureaucracy, 
parliament and aristocracy would serve to restore a harmonious, “organic” relationship 
between monarchy and nation, while neutralising the appeal of republicanism, 
constitutionalism and Caesarism.
42
  Finally, in Die Staatskrankheit, Frantz was already 
warning against the potential dangers that a resurgent French imperial Bonapartism might 
pose to the security of Germany, noting that “I do not in any sense mean to recommend the 
Napoleonic constitution...I say only, that this constitution is capable of fostering a very great 
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development of power (Machtentwicklung).”43  All of this strongly suggests that while Frantz 
may have seen Napoleonismus as a viable regime for modern France, he was ambiguous 
about its implications for Europe, and firmly opposed to the establishment of anything similar 
in Germany. 
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The 1852 pamphlet on Napoleon’s coup d’état tends to be the single piece of evidence cited 
by those historians who have stressed Frantz’s position in the putative genealogy of German 
fascism.  But Louis Napoleon was merely one text within a long sequence of publications in 
which Frantz grappled with the problems of democracy, liberalism, nationalism and 
Caesarism in Europe.  Probably the most important subsequent work in this sequence was 
Frantz’s Untersuchungen über das europäische Gleichgewicht (1859), which was a major 
contribution to contemporary discussions about the future of Europe and the shape of the 
emerging German nation-state.
44
  This text is central to my argument because it illuminates 
how Frantz connected his analysis of Napoleonismus to a wider account of the changing 
structure of international relations.  The text should be situated in two immediate contexts: 
the first was the debate about the ramifications of France’s interference in northern Italy in 
1859 (which was widely seen as an exercise in Bonapartist Imperialismus), and the second 
was the foundation, in the same year, of the German Nationalverein, which would become an 
important institutional forum for the National Liberal party, which advocated a kleindeutsch 
solution to the German question.
45
  The Italian dimension was particularly important, since 
Napoleon III’s intervention had sparked controversy within Germany about the role it should 
play in the contest between France and Austria (whose rule in Lombardy and Venetia Frantz 
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supported), and more generally about the viability of a unitary Italian state.
46
  Frantz, it is 
worth noting, was deeply sceptical towards the prospect of creating any form of federal or 
unitary state from the chaos of what he saw as Italy’s fragmentary local patriotisms in 1859, 
and he later looked back critically on Italy’s unification as leading to the formation of yet 
another centralised, but dangerously unstable, European state.
47
  The broader intellectual 
context was the nineteenth-century debate about the appropriate relationship between “nation” 
and “state,” a topic which had preoccupied Frantz since the late 1840s.48  By the late 1850s, 
he had come to think of the Nationalitätsprincip – the principle that state and (linguistic) 
nation should be coterminous – as a form of modern political dogmatism and even as an 
instrument of Bonapartist propaganda, which was now being thoughtlessly pursued in both 
Italy and Germany.
49
  The main purpose of his book on the European balance of power was 
thus to sketch out a radical federalist alternative to the politics of nationality and militarism as 
these were playing out across Europe in the 1850s.  Much more could be said about that, but 
for our present purposes we need especially to note how far Frantz’s evaluation of 
Napoleonismus changed between 1852 and 1859, as he placed increasing emphasis on the 
threats posed by a democratically-legitimated French “empire” to the stability of Europe. 
 
Frantz’s discussion of Napoleonismus in 1859 was set against a broader account of the 
dramatic changes which had unfolded in the international state system since the 1815 Treaty 
of Vienna.  The central claim here was that the European balance of power no longer 
provided an effective guarantee of peace and stability.  The idea of a European Pentarchy 
under the dominance of five “Great Powers” had always been incoherent, but was revealed as 
completely defunct in the wake of the 1848/49 Revolutions and the Crimean War.  Even if 
Europe had once been a kind of “moral community” based on shared principles, it now rested 
on the cut-and-thrust of a purely mechanical conception of balance.
50
  Frantz’s attack on the 
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“mechanical” and artificial nature of the European balance had deep roots in German polit ical 
thought, and to some extent echoed similar criticisms of the European balance made by 
Johann Gottlieb Fichte, whose Addresses to the German Nation (from the winter of 1806-7) 
were occasionally cited by Frantz in the Untersuchungen.
51
  But he was also closely attuned 
to novel developments of the 1850s.  Most dramatically, Frantz claimed the Vienna order had 
been definitively superseded by a new system of competing world powers.  The rise of the 
United States, the opening up of China to trade, the discovery of gold in California and 
Australia, and the intrusion of European powers into Africa and India meant that modern 
history had become “world history” (Weltgeschichte) in the true sense.52  The broad picture 
was of an increasingly chaotic international scene in which Europe was at the mercy of 
enormous, competing military-imperial states.   
 
Frantz identified two specific threats to the stability and independence of Europe and, in 
particular, the German states that made up its core.  The first of these was Russia, which now 
constituted a mortal threat to the independence of Germany and western Europe.  He was 
particularly scathing of a work entitled Die europäische Pentarchie (1839), which had 
proposed a kind of Russian protectorate over the small and medium-sized states of the 
German Confederation.
53
  In alerting his readers to the Russian threat, Frantz was echoing 
one of the key obsessions of German thinkers in the period, as also exemplified in Bauer’s 
Rußland und der Germanenthum.  Like Bauer, Frantz compared the precarious situation of 
the German states vis-a-vis Russia to the city-states of ancient Greece, which were 
perpetually threatened by larger imperial hegemons.
54
 
 
The other major threat to Germany (and hence to Europe) was post-revolutionary France, and 
it was in this connection that Frantz developed further his analysis of Napoleonismus.  He 
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emphasised more fully than he had done in 1852 the character of the imperial ruler as a 
“saviour of society,” who was undertaking socially-beneficial projects such as the opening of 
the Suez Canal or the eradication of pauperism.
55
  But the key to Frantz’s delineation of 
Napoleonismus remained his verdict on the distinctive nature of French egalitarian 
democracy.  Echoing the arguments he had made in 1852, Frantz described Napoleonismus as 
a modern democratic regime, grounded on “the inclinations of the masses and the demand of 
equality.”56  Equality and universal suffrage went hand-in-hand with the survival of the 
Second Empire, even while they undermined the stability of old monarchies.
57
  Nonetheless, 
Frantz’s emphasis on the disguised democratic foundations of the Bonapartist state was by no 
means an endorsement.  The general picture was of a democratically-legitimated regime in 
which the “entire state power is centralised in the person of the Emperor (Imperator).”58  
Because Bonapartism was a post-revolutionary regime that disavowed all historical structures 
of law and authority, it ultimately defaulted into an autocratic regime based on pure 
coercion.
59
 
 
The new feature of the Bonapartist regime that Frantz chose to emphasise in 1859 was its 
commitment to the “principle of nationality” (Nationalitätsprinzip).   Frantz argued that the 
principle of nationality was in fact a close cousin of democracy, because abstract conceptions 
of popular sovereignty easily defaulted into a “community of blood and language.”60  It was 
this emphasis on the proximity of popular sovereignty and nationality that pointed to Frantz’s 
initial change of mind over the consequences of Napoleonismus for modern European politics.  
While in Louis Napoleon he had hoped that French Napoleonismus might rejuvenate a tired 
continent mired in stultifying constitutionalism, he now described it as direct route towards 
war and empire.  Frantz attacked the first Napoleon for attempting to revive a Roman idea of 
Imperium that would create a uniform, united Europe under French domination.
61
  But what 
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had become more obvious by the 1850s was the ease with which revolutionary nationalisms 
across Europe could be exploited by the Napoleonic regime.
62
  Citing the various Napoleonic 
projects for intervention in Italy and Poland – as detailed in the publications of Arthur de la 
Guéronnière, the Second Empire pamphleteer – Frantz claimed that Bonaparte was using the 
rhetoric of nationality as a means of pursuing an expansionist politics that threatened the 
stability of the state system.
63
  The ultimate consequence of pursuing a politics guided by the 
Nationalitätsprincip would be the division of Europe between France and Russia in a kind of 
joint imperium or continental Dictatur.
64
  Furthermore, Frantz depicted Napoleonismus as a 
regime whose principle was expansion, and which had to remake the world in its own image 
if it was to survive.
65
  This explained Napoleon III’s sequence of catastrophic attempts at 
military intervention across Europe (his notorious Mexican misadventure had yet to take 
place). 
 
Frantz’s alternative to this frightening vision was based upon a revived German federation 
that would form a counterweight to, and would ultimately dissolve, the large military powers 
that threatened central Europe.
66
  First and foremost, this demanded that both Prussia and 
Austria relinquish their pretensions to be “Great Powers” (Größmächte), and hence pave the 
way for a genuinely federal politics anchored in the old German Confederation (Bund).  
Much of the detail of Frantz’s book was taken up with a historical narrative designed to show 
that neither Prussia nor Austria could be considered “self-sufficient and independent 
powers.”67  This was an argument which directly contradicted earlier German claims, such as 
that made in Leopold von Ranke’s famous 1833 essay on “The Great Powers,” that Prussia 
possessed all the essential criteria for independent statehood.
68
  Frantz’s alternative to 
Prussian military dominance was rooted in an idea of a German federation (Staatenbund) that 
would unite and transcend the divisions between Prussia, Austria and the small- and medium-
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sized states of southern and western Germany.  This was a deeply cosmopolitan vision of a 
future Germany as grounded on multiple pacific federations, instead of a unified, warlike 
nation-state.
69
  Here Frantz was also evoking a more widespread nineteenth-century contrast 
between the dual legacies of Rome and Germany to modern European politics, advocating a 
revival of Germany’s ancient federal traditions as an alternative to the centralised, neo-
Roman Imperialismus of France.
70
  This, he claimed, would lead to the overcoming of the 
narrow politics of self-interest (selbstsüchtigen Interessenpolitik) which had characterised 
European international relations since the Renaissance.
71
  This, incidentally, was related to 
his admiration for Fichte, who Frantz interpreted as advocating a return to a much older, 
federalist notion of German nationhood.
72
  Ultimately, Frantz suggested, a German 
Staatenbund would provide the seedbed for the transformation of the entire western European 
state system into a “western federation” (abendländischen Staatenbund).73   
 
The evidence of Frantz’s book on the European balance of power allows us to draw three 
main conclusions about the way his thinking about Napoleonismus developed after 1852.  
First, it is abundantly clear that by 1859 Frantz cannot be described as a German Bonapartist 
in any respect.  His descriptions of the French imperial regime were consistently critical, and 
even if he still saw Napoleonic politics as an appropriate regime-type for France, he 
nevertheless condemned it as a regime of naked coercion, built upon the unstable foundations 
of populist acclamation.  Second, the Untersuchungen evince Frantz’s growing tendency to 
conflate Bonapartism with nationalism and centralization, while contrasting both of these 
with his own preferred politics of federalism.  It is worth noting that this association between 
Bonapartism and the politics of unitary nation-states was echoed by contemporaries with 
federalist sympathies in this period (1859-60).
74
  Julius Fröbel, a largely sympathetic reader 
of Frantz’s work, drove home Frantz’s point when he claimed that the kleindeutsch vision of 
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a Prussian-led Germany would ultimately necessitate the arrival of a Bonaparte.
75
  This theme 
became increasingly prominent in Frantz’s thinking in the 1860s, during which he identified a 
slow drift towards Caesarist military domination, driven by Prussia.
76
  Third, and most 
generally, the Untersuchungen provide an interesting example of the ways in which mid-
nineteenth-century thinkers connected the domestic to the international, and considered the 
implications of the political democratisation of European states for the character of 
international relations.  Frantz’s argument was that the politics of revolutionary democracy, 
as exemplified in the history of France after 1789, was doomed to inspire repeated cycles of 
war, militarism and empire under the aegis of Caesarist political leaders.  This remained an 
abiding theme of Frantz’s thought into the 1860s and 1870s.77   
 
 
4 
 
Frantz’s understanding of the threat posed by Napoleonismus to European politics underwent 
a final conceptual shift during the 1860s, although anticipations of this can be found in his 
earlier writings.  The most obvious indication of this change was his increasing tendency to 
use the European term “Caesarism” (Cäsarismus) in place of the more unconventional 
Napoleonismus.  But this purely linguistic shift pointed, as such things often do, to a deeper 
modulation in Frantz’s assessment of Caesarism’s significance.  While in the 1850s he had 
seen Napoleonismus as a specifically French phenomenon, generated by the unique 
combination of a centralized polity with an atomized mass society, he began from the middle 
of the 1860s to describe Caesarism as a more general prospect facing Europe’s larger states.  
The basis of this new claim was Frantz’s striking association of Caesarism with the politics of 
liberalism, a word which had just as complex a range of meanings in Germany as it did 
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elsewhere.  In Frantz’s own usage, which broadly corresponded with that of many 
contemporary German critics of bourgeois society, both socialist and conservative, liberalism 
was associated primarily with individualism, market egoism, and a kind of shallow legalism 
in politics (needless to say, these associations were far from capturing the diversity of 
nineteenth-century liberalisms).
78
  Yet in sharp contrast with most nineteenth-century 
thinkers, who tended to distinguish liberalism and Caesarism as two incompatible, even 
mutually-opposed, regime-types, Frantz argued that the liberal-individualistic foundations of 
modern systems of political representation had the capacity to generate coercive Caesarist 
leadership.  This claim, in turn, became one of Frantz’s key arguments against the North 
German Confederation after 1866, which he viewed as yet another form of Prussian military 
dominance under the guise of a new Repräsentativsystem.
79
  Accordingly, this part of the 
article will sketch out and analyse Frantz’s rather surprising – by the standards of modern 
histories of political thought – association of Liberalismus and Cäsarismus. 
 
Some clues to the way this association developed can already be detected in Frantz’s slightly 
earlier Vorschule zur Physiologie der Staaten (1857), a work whose expressed aim was to lay 
out a new “political physiology” or “natural science” of the modern state.  He positioned this 
approach in an empirical tradition of political thinking, stretching back through Karl Salomon 
Zachariae, Montesquieu and Aristotle, that had paid due attention to “real powers” and 
historical “forces” (families, territory, climate, etc.) that shaped political life, and 
distinguished this from the excessively abstract political theories of Rousseau, Kant, and 
Hegel, whom he believed had reduced political theory to mere legal theory (Rechtslehre) or 
natural law.
80
  The emphasis on natural forces or “powers” (Kräfte), along with the distrust of 
purely speculative approaches to political thinking, had some resemblance to contemporary 
German writings, such as August Ludwig von Rochau’s famous Realpolitik (however much 
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Frantz disagreed with Rochau’s kleindeutsch sympathies).81  More importantly for my present 
argument, however, Frantz hinted in the Vorschule at the connection between “atomised” 
individualism, liberalism, and militarism that he would later discern in the North German 
Confederation.  His idea was that the individualistic foundations of liberalism, which made 
the free consent of individuals the basis of political authority, had paved the way for military 
government in a succession of European states.  Cromwell’s military regime and, more 
emphatically, the Napoleonic Empire, were the predictable results of attempts to ground 
political authority on “liberal” rational and individualistic foundations.82  Frantz saw these 
dynamics as playing out repeatedly among nineteenth-century European states, especially as 
the politics of liberal individualism coincided with the materialism unleashed by the modern 
money-economy.  According to Frantz, liberalism had a kind of self-undermining quality, as 
its tendency to produce social atomisation was accompanied by an ever-increasing 
“mechanical” state power that placed political freedom beyond reach.  His conclusion was 
that “the more that liberalism predominates, the more political life (Staatsleben) succumbs to 
military government (Militairherrschaft); as experience has proved almost everywhere.”83 
 
The association between Caesarism and liberalism was made much more explicitly in 
Frantz’s 1870 Naturlehre des Staates als Grundlage aller Staatswissenschaft, a work he 
presented as both the revision and completion of his earlier project for a new “political 
physiology.”  The purpose of this book, advertised loud and clear in its first pages, was to 
correct the confusion in which modern political thought was mired, and hence to supply new 
intellectual resources for navigating the crisis, or what he called the “process of destruction” 
(Zersetzungsprozess), afflicting modern Europe’s politics.84  Although he attacked many of 
his predecessors in political theory (including, again, Rousseau, Kant, Hegel and F. J. Stahl), 
the key intellectual target of the Naturlehre was the idea of a modern, democratically-
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legitimated, liberal-constitutional order, which Frantz termed the Repräsentativsystem.
85
  It 
was in the context of this attack on the intellectual (even metaphysical) foundations of liberal 
representation that Frantz explicitly invoked the issue of Caesarism. 
 
Once again, the key to Frantz’s identification of liberalism with Caesarism lay in his claim 
that liberalism conceived of society as a mere association of abstract, atomised individuals 
(Haufen atomer Individuen).
86
  On this definition, liberalism was the heir of seventeenth- and 
eighteenth-century natural law theory, which was also based on a disembodied and 
unhistorical vision of a purely legal subject.  According to Frantz, liberalism understood the 
state in highly attenuated terms as a “society of human beings” (eine Gesellschaft von 
Menschen), while reducing political authority to a merely legal institution (Rechtsanstalt).
87
  
Once this highly individualistic conception of society was combined with the democratic 
conceptions of popular rule unleashed by the French Revolution, the inevitable outcome was 
the rise of Napoleonic-style military regimes: 
 
Since then [i.e. the French Revolution], the single task has been to secure the 
individual’s freedom and self-dependence; all the rest, it was believed, would follow 
on from this.  This has not happened however: rather, where the dissolution of the old 
order has been most fully accomplished, and where the entire nation has been 
transformed into a mass of atomised individuals (Summe atomer Individuen), the 
much-hoped for system of freedom (Freiheitssystem) could not subsist, because of the 
lack of all binding powers (Bindekräften).  Such a situation must, rather, yield to the 
Napoleonic coercive system (Zwangsystem), as the completely natural result of 
revolution.  The Napoleonic system rests, on the one hand, on the mass of individuals 
and completely recognises individual freedom (though, admittedly, only in relation to 
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private life), while everything else, on the other hand, is ruled by the central power, 
which maintains the necessary order through artificial coercive means, among which 
the army and the police occupy the first place.
88
 
 
A few sentences after this passage, Frantz drove home the point that liberalism now rendered 
all of Europe, rather than France alone, vulnerable to “Napoleonism or Caesarism.”  
 
It appears from beneath to be democratic, and from above to be monarchical: it should, 
however, be seen neither as a democracy nor as a monarchy.  Rather, it constitutes a 
distinctive system all of its own, in which the organic binding powers are erased 
(without which neither a true republic nor a true monarchy can subsist), and where 
only the maintenance of external order is prescribed.  That this kind of system has 
become not only possible but actually unavoidable in France is a direct result of the 
French Revolution, and especially of liberalism.  The more prestige that is accorded to 
liberalism in other countries, the more Caesaristic tendencies will be unleashed there 
as well.
89
 
 
It might be added that Frantz’s perception of liberalism’s tendency to foster militarism and 
Caesarism resonates interestingly with recent historiography on the relationship between 
liberalism and empire in nineteenth-century political thought.
90
  As he wrote, liberalism had 
unleashed “imperial tendencies” (imperialistischen Tendenzen) across modern Europe.91  
Frantz might in this sense be seen as an early, perceptive critic of the tendency of liberal 
regimes to create imperial dynamics. 
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The next part of the argument was to relate Caesarism to the logic of the “representative 
system” (Repräsentativsystem).  Broadly speaking, Frantz was a critic of modern conceptions 
of representative government, which he saw as the result of flawed attempts to adapt 
Rousseau’s political thought (which, as Frantz recognised, actually eschewed representation) 
to large territorial states.
92
  He dismissed the fiction – which he likened to a camera obscura 
– by which the will of the sovereign people could be presumed to be concentrated in a group 
of elected deputies.
93
  Frantz developed this line of argument in the crucial fourth book of the 
Naturlehre, which was devoted to the topic of representation (Volksvertretung).  Some of this 
was fairly typical mid-nineteenth-century criticism of the viability of universal suffrage for 
socially stratified contemporary societies.  But his more intriguing argument centred on the 
capacity of modern notions of representation, especially as these had developed in the 
egalitarian traditions of French republicanism, to generate Caesarist or Napoleonic political 
regimes.  According to Frantz, the logic of representation permitted Louis-Napoleon to 
legitimately claim that he represented, or “personified,” the entirety of the French people, 
whose unitary will (Volkswille) he now embodied.
94
  Once one admitted the idea that the 
popular will could somehow be transferred to a representative body or agency, there was no 
logical obstacle to the embodiment – or personification – of the people’s will in a single 
authoritarian leader.  Here Frantz was arguing that liberal theories of representative 
government contained no barrier against the rise of “personification,” a key term in the 
vocabulary of nineteenth-century Bonapartism (as set out, for instance, in Louis-Napoleon’s 
famous 1839 Des idées napoléoniennes).
95
  As Frantz memorably summarized: “Once 
everything depends merely on election, then the people need only elect one individual, e.g. 
Louis-Napoleon, and whatever this individual desires, that is the will of the people, which 
can be equally well represented by its own elected Emperor (Kaiser) as by a numerous 
assembly (Kammer), which can in this case be deemed totally superfluous.  What, then, 
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should we think of this representative system (Repräsentativsystem), which can be 
transformed into Caesarism, just as easily as one turns one’s hand over?”96  Even more 
pointedly, he wrote that “every abstract system finally contradicts itself…Individualism tends 
towards Caesarism, and the unique and indivisible republic tends towards the unique and 
indivisible dictatorship.”97 
 
All this provided Frantz with the ammunition he needed for his primary strategic aim in the 
Naturlehre, which was to demonstrate the hidden Caesarist dangers lurking in the recently-
created North German Confederation.  The establishment of the Prussian-dominated 
Nordbund in 1866, following Prussia’s victory in the Austro-Prussian war, along with Otto 
von Bismarck’s introduction of universal suffrage as the basis of elections to the Reichstag, 
combined all of Frantz’s nightmares simultaneously.  To his mind, it looked like Germany 
was developing into precisely the kind of centralised, militaristic and democratically-
legitimated state that had emerged, with such catastrophic results, in post-revolutionary 
France.  These developments threatened to destroy forever the possibility of constructing a 
healthy German federation that would fulfil Germany’s “task” (Beruf) in maintaining 
European balance.  Frantz characterised the state-form that was emerging in Germany as an 
uninspiring combination of economic guardian and military overlord.
98
  More pointedly, he 
claimed that Prussia’s political and military dominance of the new system would lead directly 
to the replication of Caesarist politics in Germany, a development which added a further 
threat to the stability of Europe: 
 
The entire nation has collapsed into three pieces, the reunification of which will only 
take place in the distant future, after many conflicts.  The former federal states, 
furthermore, have been coerced into an oppressive military system, and in the new 
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Nordbund, which has partially stepped into the place of the old Bund, political 
institutions (öffentlichen Verhältnissen) increasingly take on the character of 
Caesarism, which must unavoidably be the case in the complete absence of a 
historical and moral (sittlich) foundation.  Finally, the entire European state system 
has lost its most important support (Halt), and now rests merely on the tip of a 
bayonette.
99
 
 
Here Frantz can be read as answering Heinrich von Treitschke’s earlier assertion that a united 
Germany under Prussian leadership would never be threatened by the “ghost of Caesarism.”  
Treitschke had made this claim in his 1864 Bundesstaat und Einheitsstaat, in which he 
attacked the “particularist” devotees of the German federal tradition and argued that a 
Prussian-led Germany would not fall under a permanent rule of the sword (Herrschaft des 
Säbels).
100
  One of the main claims of Treitschke’s slightly later writings on French 
Bonapartism (1865-71) was that the vitality of Germany’s monarchical traditions would 
continue to immunise it against the combination of democracy and tyranny that characterised 
the “state life” of contemporary France.101  Frantz’s claim that there existed a “good deal of 
Napoleonismus” in Bismarck’s politics (“Und wie viel Napoleonismus steckt in der heutigen 
Bismarck’schen Politik!”) thus not only sheds an interesting contemporary light on twentieth-
century controversies about Bismarck’s “Bonapartism,” but can also be read as a direct 
rejoinder to Treitschke’s position.102  His warning was that to transform Germany into a 
centralised, potentially democratic, and unitary state (Einheitsstaat) was precisely to open a 
door to the kind of populist, coercive, military regime that characterised Caesarism in its 
French context. 
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I would like to draw two main conclusions from this examination of how Frantz confronted 
the problems of French Napoleonismus and assessed its implications for Europe.  The central 
argument I have sought to make is that the modern image of Frantz as a kind of German 
Bonapartist is deeply misleading.  The image itself is the result of concentrating on one quite 
famous text – Louis Napoleon – and of drawing general conclusions from that text about his 
political preferences.  Yet, as I have argued, Louis Napoleon was something of an outlier 
within the range of Frantz’s intellectual output, and in any case his endorsement of 
Napoleonismus as a viable regime for modern France by no means implies that he wished to 
see it replicated elsewhere.  Indeed, in several writings from the same year he published 
Louis Napoleon, he explicitly rejected Caesarism as a model for Prussia, and instead 
proposed a reformed dynastic monarchy, based on a closer “social bond” between the king 
and the people, and where active monarchical leadership in the areas of social reform and 
industrial policy would serve to neutralise the appeal of democracy and liberalism.  As this 
further suggests, the nature of Frantz’s alternative to revolutionary democracy and modern 
liberalism needs to be handled with considerable care.  In particular, the designation of Frantz 
as a German or “Prussian” conservative is far too crude.  Throughout his work, Frantz 
rejected “Legitimism” or “Restorationism” in political thought, and levelled particular 
criticisms at the “Restorationism” of the Gerlach circle, who drew heavily on the political 
thought of Karl Friedrich von Haller and Friedrich Julius Stahl.
103
  A better prospect for 
clarifying Frantz’s political thought lies in a revised appreciation of the depth of his federalist 
alternative to the modern nation-state.  If in one sense he looked backwards towards the old 
German Reich (and, even more distantly, to ancient Greek federal arrangements) in another 
sense he looked forward to a world without centralised states.  This might still be described 
as a kind of German conservatism, but it was clearly one sharply at odds with the state-
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centred, nationalistic, and military ethos that has become the stereotypical image of 
conservatism in its Prussian guise. 
 
More broadly still, Frantz’s example suggests the need for some amendments to the way in 
which the intellectual history of Bonapartism and Caesarism has been written, especially 
from a German perspective.  It is perhaps understandable that the history of these concepts 
has often been motivated by larger questions about the intellectual origins of fascism, 
especially since many of the earliest considerations of fascism were themselves organised 
around comparisons with Bonapartism or Caesarism.
104
  The question about the relationship 
between nineteenth-century Bonapartism and twentieth-century fascist dictatorship has also 
been a hidden (and sometimes not-so-hidden) subtext of German post-war historical 
scholarship, including a notorious controversy over Bismarck’s “Bonapartism.”105  Frantz’s 
example provides a useful reminder of some of the dangers that might arise from efforts to 
construct a genealogy of modern fascism in its German guise.  Put bluntly, the resonance of 
Frantz’s ideas in 1933 cannot possibly tell us anything about his intentions in 1852.  
Furthermore, although similarities might be discerned between Frantz’s and Carl Schmitt’s 
criticisms of the mechanisms of liberal parliamentary representation, Frantz did not in any 
sense endorse the “dictatorial and Caesaristic methods” that Schmitt claimed were perfectly 
compatible with true democratic homogeneity.
106
  Finally, Frantz’s more unusual association 
of liberal parliamentarism with Caesarism should guard us against the temptation of 
constructing nineteenth-century intellectual history as a kind of binary struggle between 
Parlamentarismus and Cäsarismus (to borrow the title of Michael Stürmer’s 1973 book).  As 
I remarked at the beginning, it is essential to avoid a hidden teleology which transforms the 
nineteenth-century critics of liberal parliamentarism into the “precursors” or “forerunners” of 
the spokesmen for the “true democracy” of plebiscitary Caesarism in the 1920s.  Frantz’s 
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delineation of modern Napoleonismus was not a stepping-stone on the road towards German 
fascism. 
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